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Abstract 
This dissertation studies the impact of successive PE owners on the performance of 
companies after finally they went public through an initial public offering. The 
emergence of secondary (leverage) buyouts in the last decade that has made the 
companies staying much more time under PE-management, under different owners, has 
create new challenges to those companies after they are finally exit to the public 
markets. The academic research has not yet provides enough evidence of the full 
consequences of this new phenomenon. This dissertation pretends to increase the 
knowledge on that area by analysing the operating performance of those companies 
after the IPO. Evidence suggest an underperformance of the secondary buyouts backed-
IPOs, as the challenge faced with the implicit extension of the holding period under PE-
management seems to seriously affect firm’s operation performance afterwards, thus 
jeopardizing the idea of Private Equity as the long-term governance structure. 
.  
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1. Introduction 
This work pretends to study how the secondary buyouts (SBO) transactions – more than 
one consecutive leverage buyouts (LBO) transaction involving the same company – 
more precisely how the increase of time spent under private equity (PE) ownership 
(increase overall holding period) can affect the post-IPO (initial public offering) 
operational performance of the company.  Since private equity firms usually have an 
aggressive and dashing way to operate, we will study how the time the company as a PE 
portfolio company affects the long term performance of the company after being listed 
(or relisted) in the stock markets. 
Due to limited information we will study only companies that exited throughout IPOs, 
as other operations are not publicly disclosure. Listed companies not only have the 
share price settle everyday by the market but also are required to provide financial 
statements on a quarterly basis. Using this kind of information we can create a solid 
comparison framework between general IPOs, PE-backed IPOs and PE-backed IPOs of 
companies involved in at least one secondary buyout transaction (SBO-backed IPO), 
through different sectors, properly inferring the importance of time spent under PE 
management (as well as the number of different owners) on the future performance of 
the companies. 
The conclusions of this study will be of importance, economically meaningful in both 
academic and investment level. The conclusions will help us, for instance, to assess how 
PE ownership is beneficial long after they have exit the company or even if PE is, as 
suggested by Jensen (1989), the ultimate form of governance. 
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2. Literature Review 
In order to fully understand the problematic around the extension of the holding period 
in PE funds and its implications, particularly in the SBO-backed IPOs, we conducted a 
literature review on the fundamental and most up to date academic literature regarding 
the subject, to create a critic background framework, which will be imperative to 
properly analyse our results. 
2.1. Private Equity 
Private equity can be divided into two separate categories, venture capital (VC) and 
leverage buyouts (LBO). Venture capital is usually a speculative investment on young, 
private owned companies with high growth potential, usually not obtaining the majority 
control (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2008). Moreover, it is possible to distinguish seed 
capital and venture capital, in the perspective of existence or not an actual company 
rather than a business idea.  Leverage buyouts, on the other hand, consists on 
investments on mature companies, private or public owned, using only a small portion 
of equity proportionally to the amount of debt financing, aiming to acquirer full control 
of the companies.  LBO firms are usually referred to, and refer to themselves, as private 
equity firms (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2008), and are the focus of this dissertation. 
Private equity funds are assembled by PE firms, also referred as general partners, and 
the responsible for the management of the fund, and by investors, or limited partners, 
that provide the majority of the fund capital (up to 99%). The fund is therefore a limited 
partnership that typically has a fixed life, usually ten years, but can be extended. When 
the fund is assembled, PE firms have usually no more than five years to identify target 
companies, invest the committed capital and an additional five to eight years to return 
capital to investors, the holding period on the portfolio. Once the capital is employed, 
limited partners have little or nothing to say as long as the basic covenants of the fund 
agreement are followed.  
Private equity firms, the general partners, are compensated in several different ways. 
The compensation usually comes from managerial fees on the funds capital 
commitments or/and a percentage of the capital employed, carried interest on the value 
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added that goes up to 20 percent of the fund profits and also deal and monitoring fees 
charged to the companies under management. 
Private equity deals had a great occurrence on the 80’s, also known as the first wave, 
when leverage was very affordable and available and favourable economic 
environment, which boosted PE deals to obtain great returns (Guo et al., 2011). During 
the followed decade the activity dropped firmly, until in the 2000’s when the PE activity 
raised once again and a new phenomenon emerged, the secondary leverage buyout. 
These buyouts, consist of acquiring of a previously PE owned company and 
consequently postpone the holding period under PE management; basically the SBO 
transactions are LBO transactions in which both the seller and the buyer are PE firms.  
2.1.1. Value Creation Process 
In recent studies, there is a general consensus that private equity funds had large 
positive returns on their portfolios, so creating value for their investors (Guo et al., 
2011) but also that companies in their portfolio experience better financial performance 
after being exit (through an IPO), when compared to other IPOs (Cao and Lerner, 
2009). Those conclusions were, in general, similar to the ones regarding studies 
conducted during the 80’s, during private equity first wave.  
The production of large tax shields due to amount of leverage used in this deals (Guo et 
al., 2011), the reduction of agency costs as better corporate governance models and 
management practices are implemented (Jensen,1989),  and operation restructuring in 
order to increase efficiency (Kaplan, 1989) are the three pillars of value creation process 
undertaken by PE firms.  
2.1.1.1. Leverage Buyouts 
The use of huge amounts of leverage is a key feature of these transactions. After the 
buyout, PE firms transfer the debt collected for the acquisition of the target to the 
company itself, protecting themselves with the appropriate covenants to ensure the 
limited liability responsibility for the operation. This is much likely the main reason for 
being mature, strong cash flow producing, and low reinvestment capital (Sousa and 
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Jenkinson, 2011) companies the target of the funds, as it is required to keep up with the 
debt service. Leverage beside producing large tax shields which will ultimately improve 
tax efficiency (Kaplan, 1989; Guo et al., 2011), also can be seen as a disciplinarian 
constrain for managers thus reducing agency costs (Jensen, 1989). Furthermore, the 
small portion of equity enables PE firms to commit the fund capital in larger deals, 
hence aiming for more ambitious returns, in fact is this leverage – this advantage – that 
characterize this type deals. 
2.1.1.2. Agency Costs 
Agency cost, being in this particular case just the economic cost of the misalignment 
between the managers or the management board (agents) actions and shareholder’s 
expectations, are also of the up must importance to the success of this deals. 
Besides to the disciplinary effect leverage has on managers, as previously mentioned, in 
PE deals, managers incentives consisting of equity participation and performance 
related bonus, which along with better governance and better internal control 
mechanisms, often imposed by PE firms, further decrease agency costs and 
consequently, improving the overall financial value of the company under management. 
As management teams are usually brought into the companies after the buyout by the 
PE firms (management buy-in) the manager interest and expectations are highly 
correlated to the PE firms, and ultimately the limited partners, or shareholders of the 
funds. 
2.1.1.3. Operational Improvements 
This last source of value creation on PE deals is also based on the necessity to comply 
with the massive debt service. PE target companies, are usually mature companies 
associated with heavy and non-flexible structures and a significant number of assets 
unallocated to the core business. After the buyout, several measures are taken in order 
to make the structure more flexible and all asses unallocated will be available for sell. 
Operational improvements are of such importance that Guo et al. (2011) suggested that 
without consistent operation gains, returns will be unlikely in poor credit and market 
conditions, thus suggesting that leverage and reduction of agency costs are not self 
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capable to generate returns. This is quite important as the path of further discussion will 
lead us to understand if long-term holding on a PE portfolio can be feasible and 
profitable.  
2.2. Initial Public Offering - IPO 
Initial public offering consists on a public transaction where company’s shares are sold 
to general investors in a given stock exchange for the first time. IPO’s entails several 
changes on the company governance structure, ownership structure and corporate 
financing structure. There are several motivations to this operation, which will be noted 
below. Operations are assisted by investments banks, also referred to as underwriters, 
that serve as intermediates, providing the assessment of company’s value and also 
establishing the IPO share price, the offered price at which potential investors can buy 
shares before those become tradable in secondary markets. IPO timing tends to follow 
distinct pattern, seeking the best market conditions, but also have a business culture 
aspect linked to it, as geographic asymmetric is very common.   
2.2.1 Motivations of IPO’s 
There are several reasons and motivations for a company to list its equity on a public 
traded exchange. The decision entails both advantages and disadvantages hence to 
understand the operation details becomes crucial for the success of the operation. Roell 
(1996) summarized the motivations and also the advantages and disadvantages to go 
public. The first reason is the access to new financing, both equity and debt, becomes 
more available for a listed company. Diversification and risk sharing are also valuable 
motivations for the owners of the company to desire the IPO. 
Moreover, Brennan and Franks (1995) stress that the original owner may prefer 
dispersed share ownership in order to discourage excessive meddling by large external 
shareholders, who do not take into account the value to the entrepreneur of obtaining his 
control rents. Pickens (1987) suggested that liquidity in the capital markets can be a 
prerequisite for the raising of capital, equity and non-equity, which stress once more the 
increased availability of capital sources arising out from the listing on the capital 
markets. 
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The second main reason stated by Roell is the enhancement of company image and 
publicity. The use of IPOs as a marketing tool and to achieve the public recognition of a 
high standard and robustness may improve all stakeholders’ perception of the company 
and enhance the wiliness to be involved. 
Managerial and employees motivation can also be further enhanced as the company 
becomes public. The natural response by employee and managers to the growth 
intention carried out on the moment the company goes public is referred as one of the 
advantages experienced. Share participation on the remuneration schemes becomes 
possible as market liquidity can provide a powerful incentive to the performance 
improvement of the staff.  
One other reason for the IPO is the original shareholders will to liquidate all or part of 
their holdings. Once again, a cultural trend can be notice, as some authors, Ransley 
(1984) and Jenkinson and Espenlaub (1991), found a high degree of disinvestment for 
the founder shareholders in the UK market as on the other hand in Italian and Swedish 
markets, Pagano et al. (1995) and Rydqvist and Hiigholm (1995), reported that more 
than half of the original owner did not cash in the IPOs. The latest follow the general 
believe that founding owners are just willing to disinvest the required capital to provide 
the market with enough liquidity without compromising their requirement for corporate 
control.  Some other owners justified the IPO with the lack of succession on family 
owned companies rather than the willing or necessity to sell their property. 
It has been also stated that the managers exploitation of the market timing and the 
optimistic sentiment on the market to take advantages of an overvaluation of the 
company’s equity. It is consistent with the IPOs snowball effect on growth periods on 
the capital markets comparing with the lack of IPO activity on other periods. 
Even though several advantages are referred above, the public listing entails nonetheless 
some disadvantages as well. The transitions cost, underwriting commissions, the cost of 
information disclosure and constrains to the action freedom in making business decision 
are some of the most important disadvantages experienced when going public. 
Moreover, the danger of losing corporate control also seems to be a major obstacle to 
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the decision, and some reluctance to give up that control may be the cause of some 
discomfort by the original shareholders to relinquish those rights. 
2.2.2. IPOs Performance 
The performance of companies prior and after an IPO has been a subject of extent 
studied over the years and some puzzles emerged on this matter. The difficulty 
associated with the correct valuation of companies prior to the IPO seems to 
consistently produce under-priced shares. Hence according with Loughran and Ritter 
(2002), only 9% of US IPOs, between 1990 and 1998, experienced a decrease on the 
share value on the debut day on the stock markets. This consistent under-pricing of IPO 
shares has been justified not only by the difficulty to correctly valuate equity before the 
listing, but also with the fact that underwriters tend to sell at a sale price in order to 
ensure the quick sell of all the shares and consequently assure the  receipt of the total 
spread. 
Nonetheless, in the long-term perspective the investment on new listed companies 
seems to be a bad investment as the long run performance is poor. Brav et al. (2000) 
shown that, between 1975 and 1992, the five years after the IPO change on the equity 
value underperformed, on average, by 44% on the S&P 500. Ritter and Welch (2002) 
found, on the same index, between 1980 and 2001, that the subsequent three years 
indicate an underperformance by 23.4% on average. Those studies consistently 
demonstrate that even though the IPO price seem under valuated on the early days after 
the IPO, in the long term the price seem to level when the demand is not as significant. 
In a different approach, Jain and Kini (1994) studied the operational performance of 
firms when they became listed, and found evidence suggesting a strong decrease in 
operating performance of firm as a consequence of the listing.  Comparing the operation 
performance to the pre-IPO levels to the five years post-IPO, declines in market-to-book 
ratio, price over earnings and earnings per share were documented. The authors blame 
the excess of the market expectations on the progressive growth of those indicators 
post-IPO, which in the reality they underperform the pre-IPO levels. Once more this 
study, even though with a different approach, strengthens the idea of low performance, 
both financially and operationally, of IPO firms.  
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2.2.3. PE-backed IPOs 
Since the short-term nature of PE funds, one of the main issues on these deals is the exit 
strategy. After the proper holding period, and the increments of value of the assets 
under management, the PE firms have to repay fund investors, limited partners, and 
cash in incremented value, thus beginning the delineation of the exit strategy. There are 
several possible exist strategies, such as: IPO, the public listing of share capital; trade 
sale, a sale to a strategic investor; secondary leverage buyouts, to sell directly to other 
PE firm; recapitalization, the cash in through the leveraging of the capital structure and 
subsequently the attribution of a  special dividend; and in the worth case scenario 
Bankruptcy. Historically IPO and trade sale have been the most used exit strategy all 
over the years, although in recent years the SBO exit strategy is increasing remarkably, 
which is the focus of this study. Since IPOs provide more information to the market 
those firms performance have been subject to a substantial amount of academic studies.   
In order to assess if the IPOs underperformance would replicate in the venture backed 
companies, Brav and Gompers (1997), studied 934 venture backed IPOs and 3407 non-
venture backed IPOs. Using comparable benchmark analysis and Fama and French 
three factorial model, they concluded that venture backed IPOs do not significantly 
underperformed. Also, using equal returns weight venture backed IPOs outperform the 
non-venture backed IPOs. Although in the sample used by the authors, there are several 
low capitalization issues which may blurred results, and not fully assess the difference 
between the performance of PE backed IPOs and non PE backed IPOs. 
Cao and Lerner (2009) studied the stock performance of a sample of 496 reverse 
leverage buyouts, the IPO of PE-backed companies, between 1980 and 2002, in the 
three and five years after the offerings. Their results consistently support the idea that 
PE-backed IPOs outperform the non PE-backed IPOs as well as the market as a whole. 
Moreover, there is no evidence of deterioration over time, meaning that this trend has 
been consistent over the years, which gives a substantial reliability to the results. One 
other important conclusion of this work is regarding the underperformance of the quick 
flips – companies owned by PE funds for a period less than one year – which support 
the idea that PE firms cannot significantly restructure and operationally improve 
companies with such a short holding period. 
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2.3. Secondary Leverage Buyouts 
Secondary leverage buyouts have been an emerging exist route for the most recent 
deals, leaving behind IPOs as one of the most used exist strategy of the past decade. 
Strömberg (2008) presented data showing that SBOs were the second most common 
exit route, between 1970 and 2007, only behind trade sales, accounting of 24% of all 
exits strategies. Moreover, SBOs have grown from a 13% weight in all buyouts in the 
80s to a staggering 35% between 2005 and 2010 (Wang, 2010). This new phenomenon 
and its financial implications for corporations still raises some question on determine 
whether or not these deals create financial value for the stakeholders. Furthermore, it 
materializes the idea of private equity as a long-term governance model which has been 
a hot debated topic for the last twenty years. 
2.3.1. PE as a long term governance structure? 
The emerge of SBOs transactions seems consistent with Jensen (1989)’s claims of PE as 
superior long-term governance structure and prediction that it would became a more 
permanent organization model promoting the disappearance of publicly traded firms.  
Although, some authors fully disagree with Jensen’s point of view. Rappaport (1990) 
was one of the first critics of the idea of PE being a long-term governance structure. He 
defended that LBOs had limited market and limited life time as the amount of debt 
required in this types of deals would cause loss of financial flexibility and short 
sightedness of business strategies. So he claimed that PE modus operandi is more of a 
“shock therapy” to restructure an inefficient and low operation performance company in 
few years and to return it to investors yielding large returns, than a permanent structure 
that can replicate results over several years. 
This discussion is still going on currently, as we will state below, and the increase in 
SBOs in the previous years (Strömberg, 2008) just has furthermore fomented more 
academic research on this matter. To understand how these deals affect companies 
performance can be very helpful determining whether or not PE can be a long-term 
organization structure or on the other hand a “shock therapy” to reboot mature, low 
performing, companies and to return them public on a short term basis.  
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2.3.2 Secondary leverage buyouts performance 
Sousa and Jenkinson (2011) compared the post-exit operational performance of 308 
private equity backed firms that either were exited going public through IPOs or 
through other LBO deals (SBOs). The authors study points out the “lack of main 
opportunities for operation improvements that usually motivate the deals” after 
concluded that PE backed firms exiting through IPOs outperform, in terms of total sales 
and earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA), SBOs 
firms, during the first three years after the exit. Also that net cash flow increased more 
on SBOs firms than in IPO firms, as those increased more their investment in fixed 
assets (CAPEX). This figure is relevant since SBOs firms, due to the amount of debt in 
their deals, have large requirements of cash flow to keep up with their debt service, and 
the disinvestment on assets may support Rappaport (1990) point of view on the short 
sightedness of business strategies conducted by those firms. 
Moreover, the authors analyzed SBOs firms operation performance as a function of 
their holding period in the previous deal, concluding that it is better if the firms stayed 
only for a short period of time (2 to 4 years) in the previous deal than for a longer 
holding period (4 to 7 years), once more supporting the Rappaport idea that PE firms 
are just able to improve operation performance for a limited period of time. One other 
possible explanation for the underperformance of SBOs firms when compared with 
those exiting through an IPO is that, on average, those exiting through SBOs were more 
10 months under PE ownership on the previous deal, than those exited trough IPOs.  
Once more, and consistently throughout recent literature on the subject, the holding 
period seems to be a fundamental figure in order to fully assess the impact of PE 
organizational structure on the operating performance of a given firm.  
Wang (2010) compared the LBOs deals, first-time buyouts, with the SBOs deals, 
founding evidence supporting the notion that SBOs follow a trend consistent with the 
market conditions.  This contradicts the efficiency gains widely documented in the first-
time buyouts as the source of value creating.  Hence, new motivations emerge for the 
SBOs, rather different from the ones proposed for the LBOs deals, such as the equity 
market conditions, the debt market favourability or the cash-in necessity for the 
previous private equity firm. 
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 A “cold” equity market, measured by the IPO industry volume, seems less appealing to 
use of IPOs as an exit strategy and consequentially low fundamentals will also 
jeopardize the trade sale in the private equity perspective. Although the investors 
demand for return may impose the necessity to cash-in, which can be seen, in addition 
to favourable debt market, as an opportunity for other PE firms to postpone the listing to 
a more equity market favourable period and get positive returns, throughout a SBO 
transaction. Also the fact that SBOs are priced at a premium and cannot be explained by 
fundamentals strengthens the importance of future market perspectives of the PE firms 
managing SBOs in succeeding with the operations. 
This perspective seems consistent with the trend pattern found and does present a 
credible set of alternative motivations for the SBO. Moreover, the author also found 
mixed evidence regarding the efficiency gains, since SBOs consistently present higher 
profits but deterioration of the four profitability measures proposed, EBITDA/sales, 
EBITDA/fixed assets, earning/sales and return on assets.   
In other study comparing the first LBOs with SBOs, Bonini (2013) studied the 
operational performance of respective funds. His research concluded that LBO present 
large positive returns, consistent with previous studies, but SBOs do not show 
statistically significant evidence of performance improvement but also present higher 
leverage levels and liquidity constrains. Those findings seem to support Rappaport 
(1990) argument that long-term highly leverage capital structure ultimately will lead to 
loss of financial flexibility.  
One other very interesting fact is that even though both, LBOs and SBOs, presenting 
positive returns for the PE fund investors, the SBO investors are remunerated with 
lower returns and likely coming from dividends payments. Once again evidence was 
found supporting that SBOs occurred with better debt market conditions, hence there is 
a certain periodicity conducting the operations. 
2.4 Relevance of the post-IPO performance analysis of SBO-backed IPOs  
When analysing the literature review on the subject, it seems that evidence is still 
nonexistent or absent referring to the effect on firms’ performance of the extension of 
the holding period under PE management, after the firm is listed or relisted on the stock 
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market. This study will provide new evidence, as it measures the performance of 
companies, that are actually in the same conditions, all listed in the financial markets, 
based on their own background, whether or not having been under PE funds holding and 
particularly in more than one fund consecutively, the SBO-backed IPOs. Aiming to 
provide a clear idea of the public firms’ operational behaviour based on the past 
holding, this study will be conducted with the up most recent data available and a strong 
dataset of firms based on their previous ownership, collected from Standards and Poor’s 
Capital IQ database. 
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3. Methodology 
In order to empirically study the operational post-IPO performance, to assess the 
different performance between non PE-backed IPOs, PE-backed IPOs and SBO backed 
IPOs, we based our method in Kaplan (1989) and Sousa and Jenkinson (2010), which 
established the accounting figures on which we will support our performance analysis 
for the first three full years after the IPO. Those accounting figures consist of: (i) total 
equity, the accounting value of shareholders position; (ii) total assets, the accounting 
value of the firm’s investment, financed both by equity and debt, (iii) total sales, the 
total revenue generated by the company´s activity; and three proxies of cash-flow 
variables, (iv) EBITDA, representing the cash generated by the company’s operation (v) 
EBITDA minus CAPEX, the operational earnings deducted of investment in fixed 
assets, and (vi) net cash flow, computed as EBITDA minus change in working capital, 
that furthermore assess the cash flow creation capacity of the sample firms, subtracting 
the change in working capital to the EBITDA will ensure the actual perspective of the 
capacity to generate cash.  
The use of those measures of operation performance is justified with the fact that 
EBITDA minus CAPEX will account the reinvestment on fixed assets required for the 
continuity of the stream of cash-flows in the future and the net cash flow, computed as 
EBITDA minus change in working capital, represents cash generated taking into 
account the investment or disinvestment in working capital, so both providing primary 
components of net present value analysis used in financial valuation.  
As in both papers quoted above, each cash-flow variable will be computed in levels, (vi) 
as a fraction of end of period total assets (each cash-flow variable/Assets) and (vii) as a 
fraction of the total sales (each cash-flow variable margin), which will ensure us control 
over the variables but also establish a productivity and profitability comparison. 
Moreover, in order to establish a better analysis we will decompose the each cash-flow 
variable over total assets, in their faction of the total sales and in (viii) turnover assets, 
the total sales over total assets, which will measure the efficiency of the use of assets in 
generating revenue. 
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The comparison, using all the variables above, will ensure us the capacity to establish 
the differences between all the IPOs, its subsample of PE-backed IPOs and its own 
subsample of SBO backed IPOs. 
One more important comment on the accounting figures is the use of before taxes 
measures. It is so to ensure that all the changes will be due to management operating 
decisions rather than tax or financial decisions. 
In order to measure the change in the operating performance variables, as in several 
studies, we assume the median change from the last full year before the exit (t-1) and 
the full three years after it, (t+1, t+2 and t+3), being the median value of [(Xit+j/Xit-1) – 
1]. The used of the median against the average is justified by the elimination of 
outliners, values not consistent with the main trend. 
Additionally, we computed the median of each financial measure change, between the 
last full year prior the IPO and each full three years subsequent, just considering the 
year of the listing and the industry in which the firms operate. With this industry 
adjusted changes of the financial measures we can assess how each firm performed in 
comparison with its peers, firms from the same industry that gone public in the same 
year. Then we calculate the median of the industry adjusted financial measure change of 
the total IPOs, the PE-backed IPOs subsample, and SBO backed IPOs. In order to 
present consistent results we had to exclude from our industry adjusted analysis, all 
firms that were the only IPO in one particular year and sector, thus we experience a 
reduction of data when comparing to the raw median changes. 
Finally, we compute the one sample Wilcoxon signed rank test, to determine that each 
median calculated, of each financial measure, is statistically different from zero, thus 
giving statistical significance to the changes between years. 
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4. Data Sample Analysis 
The initial data sample, collected from Standards and Poor’s Capital IQ database, 
consists of 3190 IPOs occurred between 1990 and 2009 worldwide, with an individual 
transaction value (the IPO total value) above $50 million. We choose to impose such 
value condition to our analysis in order to exclude small, none fully disclosure, 
transactions and venture capital deals. It was properly identified the PE-backed IPOs on 
the sample and its own subsample, the SBO backed IPOs. The operational performance 
analysis is conducted with a diversified and solid dataset of all IPOs, both PE-backed 
IPOs and non PE-backed IPOs, over the same period. 
The financial statements from the three exercises post-exit are mandatory, as the 
purpose of the investigation is to analyze the post-IPO performance, as well as full 
awareness of the PE firms and funds involved in the several transactions and the starting 
and exiting dates of the investment of each of the private equity firms. 
Within the sample there are 364 PE-backed IPOs in which 32 are SBO backed IPOs. It 
was likely that the dataset would be narrow, with respect to the SBO backed IPOs, as 
the secondary LBO’s boom occurred in the 2000’s and only few have already exit the 
PE portfolio. 
The distributions of the IPOs over time, summarized in Table I and illustrated in Chart 
I, clearly shows residual growth of IPOs between 1990 and 1996, followed by an IPO 
boom ending in 2001. This increase in the IPOs is consistent with the 2000-bubble also 
referred as the “dot-com” bubble. After this IPO cycle ended, IPOs occurred steadily 
until 2003-2004 when a new cycle emerged with a much more impact in the number of 
IPOs than the previous, and end rapidly, with a sharp decline in 2008, must likely 
related to the subprime bubble that deeply affected the capital markets all over the 
world. It is also clear that even PE-backed IPOs, both the LBO backed IPOs and the 
SBO backed IPOs individually, have followed the same pattern.  
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Table I: Sample description - Chronological analysis 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Panel A: All IPOs
   SBO-backed IPOs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 1 2 0 1 9 6 7 0 2
   PE-backed IPOs 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 5 5 13 16 4 10 12 26 38 43 125 15 46
   All IPOs 0 4 3 9 11 12 47 141 115 217 261 110 106 117 211 389 453 616 152 216
Year
 
This table presents all IPOs in each year of the time frame used in this dissertation, 1990-2009. Those IPOs have been grouped into 
3 dependent subsamples: all IPOs (the entire data sample); PE-backed IPOs, and secondary leverage buyout backed IPOs. 
Chart I: Sample description - Chronological analysis 
This graphic presents all IPOs in each year of the time frame used in this dissertation, 1990-2009. The primary axis, on the left, 
represents the number of  PE-backed IPOs and SBO-backed IPOs while the secondary axis, on the right, represent all IPOs. Those 
IPOs have been grouped into 3 dependent subsamples: all IPOs (the entire data sample); PE-backed IPOs, and secondary leverage 
buyout backed IPOs. 
In term of sector distribution (see Table II) both all IPOs and PE-backed IPOs seems to 
have a great correlation, but surprisingly SBO backed IPOs have low sector correlation. 
While in the both firsts, financial and business services providers seem to be the most 
representing sectors, in the secondary LBO backed IPOs, industry and transportation 
sectors appeared to have more weight in the overall sample. This could probably be due 
to the fact that those sectors have large positive cash-flows as well as higher capital 
employed, which may lead to greater and more time consuming operational 
restructuration or make them more prone to a PE management due to the larger and 
constant stream of cash-flow, necessary to fulfil the debt obligations imposed by 
successive PE investors. 
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Table II: Sample description - Industry analysis 
SIC code Sector SBO-backed IPOs PE-backed IPOs All IPOs
67 Holding and Other Investment Offices 0 19 551
73 Business Services 3 65 298
48 Communications 1 25 192
36 Electronic, Elctrcl Eqpmnt & Cmpnts, Excpt Computer Eqpmnt 0 31 169
65 Real Estate 0 4 137
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 0 16 127
60 Depository Institutions 1 4 112
35 Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment 3 18 97
62 Security & Commodity Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges & Services 0 14 87
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 1 10 86
63 Insurance Carriers 0 12 85
49 Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 0 2 73
20 Food and Kindred Products 0 4 69
38 Mesr/Anlyz/Cntrl Instrmnts; Photo/Med/Opt Gds; Watchs/Clocks 1 14 60
44 Water Transportation 1 4 58
99 Nonclassifiable Establishments 0 0 54
37 Transportation Equipment 4 6 47
87 Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management & Related Svcs 1 9 46
61 Nondepository Credit Institutions 0 2 40
10 Metal Mining 0 1 36
- Other 47 16 104 766
Transaction Type
This table presents all IPOs in each sector of economic activity of the firms in the data sample used in this dissertation. Those IPOs 
have been grouped into 3 dependent subsamples: all IPOs (the entire data sample); PE-backed IPOs, and secondary leverage buyout 
backed IPOs. The methodology used to classify each firm into a sector category was a two digit model based on the Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC codes).  
The total transaction value of the sample is $1,009 trillion. Additionally the total 
transaction median is $139 million, being $127 million and $123 million for the PE-
backed IPOs, with just one or successive PE investor, respectively. 
The geographic location of these listings is majority held in US financial indexes and in 
the south East Asia financial indexes, as it can be seen in Table III Panel A. This fact is 
not surprisingly since both are regions with highly developed financial markets and/or 
experienced great economic growth in the past decades. Additionally, we provide in 
Panel B of Table III a list of the sellers involved in the backed transactions, although 
their involvement in the listing may, or may not, have been exclusive. The top four 
firms involved in backed transactions are Warburg Pincus LLC, Goldman Sachs Group 
(Merchant Banking Division), Apax Partners LLP and Bain Capital Private Equity, 
which account only for 5% of the all firms backing those IPOs. 
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Table III: Sample description – Index location and Sellers analysis 
SBO-backed IPOs PE-backed IPOs All IPOs
Panel A. Stock exchange
   NYSE (USA) 10 88 544
   NasdaqGS (USA) 3 69 236
   SEHK (Hong Kong) 0 7 153
   LSE (UK) 0 11 92
   BOVESPA (Brazil) 0 4 91
   SZSE (China) 0 0 68
   OTCPK (USA) 1 7 51
   BSE (India) 0 0 46
   TSE (Japan) 0 0 43
   AMEX (USA) 0 0 40
   Others 18 178 1826
Panel B. Sellers
   Warburg Pincus LLC 8
   Goldman Sachs Group, Merchant Banking Division 6
   Apax Partners LLP  5
   Bain Capital Private Equity 5
   Merrill Lynch Global Private Equity 4
   TA Associates Management, L.P. 4
   TPG Capital, L.P. 4
   3i Group plc 3
   Apollo Global Management, LLC 3
   CDH Investments 3
   Others 390 433
Transaction Type
All IPOs
This table presents all IPOs in each index location and the sellers involved in backed IPOs. Those IPOs, in Panel A, have been 
grouped into 3 dependent subsamples: all IPOs (the entire data sample); PE-backed IPOs, and secondary leverage buyout backed 
IPOs. In Panel A, are presented the indexes names and country. Panel B presents the more representative sellers in backed 
transactions. The fund sellers involvement in the listing may, or may not, have been exclusive. 
Table V show the main accounting figures, i.e. total assets, total equity, total sales, 
EBITDA, EBITDA-CAPEX and net cash flow, for the last full year (t-1) before the 
IPO. Even though, it is possible to identify that in average terms all IPOs have a higher 
value in each accounting figures, in median terms SBO-backed IPOs have higher value 
while PE-backed IPOs tend to the all IPOs values, which may led to the conclusion that 
although firms backed by Private Equity may not be the largest firms listed, but requires 
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a certain “size” which reduce greatly the dispersion of value among them, thus showing 
higher medians. Nevertheless, is important to notice that even in median terms PE-
backed IPOs have higher values than all IPOs in almost all accounting figures analysed. 
Moreover, then comparing the PE-backed IPOs with the SBO-backed IPOs, the latter 
have lower average in all but two accounting figure (total sales; net cash flow) but still 
show higher median in all, which seems to show even lower dispersion between the 
SBO-backed IPOs firms. It may be also related to a requirement for certain firm’s 
characteristics by the PE firms in order to achieve their high demand for return.  
Also interesting is fact that the, average and median, equity ratio, computed as the total 
equity over total assets, are lower for PE-backed IPOs firms, when comparing with all 
IPOs, consistent with the higher amount of leverage on those firms, feature associated 
with the type of transaction, particularly on the SBO-backed IPOs. Although in median 
terms, SBO-backed IPOs have a slightly higher equity value than all PE-backed IPOs. 
These results were expected as the leverage transactions further replace shareholders by 
debt holders as the financiers of the firm’s assets.    
We also noticed the smaller percentage difference between the EBITDA and EBITDA-
CAPEX in the SBO-backed IPOs that was foreseeable when considering the literature 
review done, that suggested that in order to keep up with the high amount of debt 
service, firms without other cash resources, such as unallocated assets, would have to 
reduce the CAPEX, thus presumably under minding the future cash flow production 
capacity.  
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Table IV: Sample description – Firms statistics analysis 
Average Median Average Median Average Median
Firm statistics
   Total Assets ($ millions) 844,3 638,7 1.347,9 273,7 6.908,0 319,9
   Total Equity ($ millions) 157,6 77,1 396,8 73,7 3.241,6 94,4
   Total Sales ($ millions) 712,5 416,8 689,6 205,1 2.493,9 190,5
   EBITDA ($ millions) 94,5 58,8 110,2 42,6 623,6 41,8
   EBITDA-CAPEX ($ millions) 66,4 53,9 76,4 31,8 340,0 31,3
   Net Cash Flow ($ millions) 104,7 68,9 85,3 29,0 513,1 24,7
PE-backed IPOsSBO-backed IPOs All IPOs
Transaction Type
Variable
This table presents all IPOs accounting figures statistics (average and median) in the full year before the initial public offering (t-1). 
The accounting figures are: total assets; total equity; total sales; EBITDA; EBITDA-CAPEX and net cash flow. Those IPOs have 
been grouped into 3 dependent subsamples: all IPOs (the entire data sample); PE-backed IPOs, and secondary leverage buyout 
backed IPOs. Only firms presenting t-1 values were accounted in this analysis (Dissertation Sample).  
Since the average values for all IPOs were heavily influenced by few outliers, we 
conducted the same analysis, but removing from the sample the four most influent 
outliers IPOs
1
. The new analysis goal is to get a less dispersed set of IPOs. This 
procedure allowed a more accurate analysis of the most significant part of the dataset.. 
In Table V, we rewrite Table IV, without the four firms mention above, in order to infer 
the impact those outliner have in the sample accounting figures average. It seems clear 
that the substantial reduction in all figures’ average, thus the significant reduction of 
dispersion, and no significant change in the figures’ median, that all IPOs have 
comparable dimension, with the exceptions of a few median insignificant firms. 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Those IPOs were: (i) OAO Tatneft (MICEX:TATN); (ii) Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
Limited (SEHK:1398); (iii) Bank of China Limited (SEHK:3988); (iv) China Construction Bank 
Corporation (SEHK:939). 
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Average Median Average Median Average Median
Firm statistics
Total Assets 844,3 638,7 1.347,9 273,7 3.002,0 319,3
Total Equity 157,6 77,1 396,8 73,7 654,0 94,2
Total Sales 712,5 416,8 689,6 205,1 1.018,6 189,6
EBITDA 94,5 58,8 110,2 42,6 190,9 41,7
EBITDA-CAPEX 66,4 53,9 76,4 31,8 127,9 31,2
Net Cash Flow 104,7 68,9 85,3 29,0 108,3 24,7
Variable
Transaction Type
SBO-backed IPOs PE-backed IPOs All IPOs
Table V: Sample description –Firms statistics analysis II 
 
This table presents all IPOs, with the exception four non-backed IPOs: (i) OAO Tatneft (MICEX:TATN); (ii) Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China Limited (SEHK:1398); (iii) Bank of China Limited (SEHK:3988); (iv) China Construction Bank 
Corporation (SEHK:939),  of  accounting figures statistics (average and median) in the full year before the initial public offering (t-
1). The accounting figures are: total assets; total equity; total sales; EBITDA; EBITDA-CAPEX and net cash flow. Those IPOs have 
been grouped into 3 dependent subsamples: all IPOs (the entire data sample); PE-backed IPOs, and secondary leverage buyout 
backed IPOs. Only firms presenting t-1 values were accounted in this analysis (Paper Sample). 
Due to the lack of financial records in the year before the IPO (t-1), the overall data 
sample used was then reduced to 2,264 IPOs. The impact of this reduction on the PE-
backed IPOs and SBO backed IPOs is of 36, remaining 328 IPOs, and 5, remaining 27 
IPOs, respectively. 
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5. Results 
The results of the post-IPO performance are presented based on the each individual 
accounting figure and it sub-categories ratios. The results presented are: (i) change in 
Equity; (ii) change in Assets; (iii) change in Sales and it sub-category, change in 
Sales/Assets; (iv) change in EBITDA and it sub-categories, change in EBITDA margin 
and change in EBITDA/Assets; (v) change in EBITDA-CAPEX and it sub-categories, 
change in EBITDA-CAPEX margin and change in EBITDA-CAPEX/Assets; and 
change in net cash flow and it sub-categories, change in net cash flow margin and 
change in net cash flow/Assets. 
5.1 Change in Equity 
The analysis of median change in the total equity (see Table VI) shows a strong 
performance of all IPOs and PE backed IPOs and a non significant change of the SBO-
backed IPOs. The changes in the total equity after an IPO may be related to the better 
financial performance, dividend policy or to the capital increase subsequent to the IPO 
itself, or both. In this case, the median change in the measure strongly suggests that 
equity grow in the year after the IPO and it decrease continuously along the following 
year. The gap in the growth among the different dependent samples is the most 
notorious evidence, as mentioned above. While all IPOs and PE-backed IPOs present a 
median growth in equity in the t+1, when compared to t-1, above of 200%, strongly 
suggesting a capital increase, the SBO-backed IPOs experienced poor growth. 
Moreover, when comparing those IPOs with the industry, the SBO-backed IPOs present 
a highly significant a negative impact of -172.8%, -208.8% and -250%, for each year 
respectively. On the other hand, all IPOs and the PE-backed IPOs do not present 
significant differences in terms of industry adjusted median change, particularly when 
compared to the SBO-backed IPOs results. 
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Table VI: Total equity change after the IPO 
From t-1 to t+1 From t-1 to t+2 From t-1 to t+3
All IPOs
   Median change (%)  221.4 ***(2125)  207.1 ***(2125)  198.9 ***(2125)
PE-backed IPOs
   Median change (%)  225.5 ***(304)  221.8 ***(304)  195.4 ***(304)
   Median ind-adj change (%)  0.2 ** (276)  -3.7 * (276)  -23.6  (276)
SBO-backed IPOs
   Median change (%)  37.1 (27)  14.5 (27)  -70.6 (27)
   Median ind-adj change (%)  -172.8 *** (23)  -208.8 *** (23)  -250.0 *** (23)
This table presents the median change of the total equity between the full year before the IPO and the three consecutive full years 
after it (t+1; t+2; t+3). The median is presented both raw and industry adjusted, i.e. adjusted to the industry and the year of the IPO. 
In this table all sub-samples are dependent, as the SBO-backed IPOs are included in the PE-backed IPOs which are also included in 
the all IPOs sample. Industry adjusted median is not presented for all IPOs, as it tends towards zero. Significance levels of median 
change are based on a one sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test, being *, **, *** indicative levels where median changes for each 
subsample are significantly different from zero and where both subsample medians are different at the 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. The number of observations is in parenthesis. 
5.2 Change in Assets  
The change in total assets is shown in Table VII. All samples increase substantially in 
the accounting value of total assets, but as in other measures analysed the growth is not 
homogenous among the samples IPOs.  As all IPOs present increasing median growth 
during the three years after the IPO above the 100% growth, in the case of the PE-
backed IPOs it seems to experience an inverse parable growth, with a break in the third 
year. The SBO-backed IPOs also seem to experience the same growth behaviour as the 
PE-backed IPOs, but once more experienced a strongly inferior growth in all years 
when compared to the other samples, just 20%, 26.9% and 21.1% for t+1, t+2 and t+3, 
respectively. When analysing the median industry adjusted change, while the PE-
backed IPOs present a negative performance in t+1, it is significantly lower than the 
underperformance of the SBO-backed IPOs, that when directly compared to its peers, 
presenting a median industry adjusted change of -34.2%, -51.8% and -61.3% for t+1, 
t+2 and t+3 respectively.  
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Table VII: Total assets change after the IPO 
From t-1 to t+1 From t-1 to t+2 From t-1 to t+3
All IPOs
   Median change (%)  103.2 ***(2104)  117.2 ***(2104)  124.7 ***(2104)
PE-backed IPOs
   Median change (%)  99.2 ***(303)  108.7 ***(303)  106.1 ***(303)
   Median ind-adj change (%)  -0.3 ** (274)  -8.1  (274)  -1.9  (274)
SBO-backed IPOs
   Median change (%)  20.0 *** (27)  26.9 *** (27)  21.1 ** (27)
   Median ind-adj change (%)  -34.2 ** (23)  -51.8 ** (23)  -61.3 ** (23)
This table presents the median change of the total assets between the full year before the IPO and the three consecutive full years 
after it (t+1; t+2; t+3). The median is presented both raw and industry adjusted, i.e. adjusted to the industry and the year of the IPO. 
In this table all sub-samples are dependent, as the SBO-backed IPOs are included in the PE-backed IPOs which are also included in 
the all IPOs sample. Industry adjusted median is not presented for all IPOs, as it tends towards zero. Significance levels of median 
change are based on a one sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test, being *, **, *** indicative levels where median changes for each 
subsample are significantly different from zero and where both subsample medians are different at the 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. The number of observations is in parenthesis. 
5.3 Change in Sales 
The change in total sales can be a very important measure in determine the economic 
viability of a given entity, as in every activity each cash flow begins in the actual 
capacity to sell a product or a service. In Table VIII we see a continuous, strongly 
positive, growth in all the samples for the three years after the IPO (t+1 t+2 and t+3). 
However, that growth is yet again significantly lower in the SBO-backed IPOs when 
compared with the other samples.  For each year, the median growth of the SBO-backed 
IPOs seems to be less than half of the growth experienced by the PE-backed IPOs and 
all the IPOs. Even PE-backed IPOs seem to experience a lower growth when compared 
to all IPOs. The SBO-backed IPOs underperformance, when compared to the other 
samples growth, is also corroborated by the industry adjusted growth, as in all year it is 
negative, reaching a staggering -30.2% and -49.6% in the second and third years after 
the IPOI, respectively. So when compared to the other samples, and to the industry and 
year growth, it is clear that the SBO-backed IPOs firms had a poorly outcome in terms 
of revenue growth. 
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Table VIII: Total sales change after the IPO 
From t-1 to t+1 From t-1 to t+2 From t-1 to t+3
All IPOs
   Median change (%)  65.3 ***(2068)  82.7 ***(2068)  91.9 ***(2068)
PE-backed IPOs
   Median change (%)  62.2 ***(298)  75.3 ***(298)  77.5 ***(298)
   Median ind-adj change (%)  1.1 *** (271)  0.1  (271)  -2.9  (271)
SBO-backed IPOs
   Median change (%)  28.1 ***(26)  34.1 ***(26)  37.7* (26)
   Median ind-adj change (%)  -22.1  (22)  -30.2 ** (22)  -49.6 ** (22)  
This table presents the median change of the total sales between the full year before the IPO and the three consecutive full years 
after it (t+1; t+2; t+3). The median is presented both raw and industry adjusted, i.e. adjusted to the industry and the year of the IPO. 
In this table all sub-samples are dependent, as the SBO-backed IPOs are included in the PE-backed IPOs which are also included in 
the all IPOs sample. Industry adjusted median is not presented for all IPOs, as it tends towards zero. Significance levels of median 
change are based on a one sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test, being *, **, *** indicative levels where median changes for each 
subsample are significantly different from zero and where both subsample medians are different at the 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. The number of observations is in parenthesis. 
5.3.1 Change in Sales/Assets 
The Sales/Assets ratio, also known as turnover assets ratio, gives a perception on the 
efficiency each firm uses its assets to generate revenue. This ratio cannot be taken 
individually as it does not take into account the business margin, thus it can be highly 
volatile between different industries, yet it will be extremely helpful when comparing 
the some company over time.  
As displayed in Table IX, SBO-backed IPOs outperform, with a positive growth all 
other sub-samples and its industry performance. All IPOs and PE-backed IPOs have 
decrease performance in this efficiency ratio for each year. PE-backed IPOs have the 
most significant decrease, of -5.5%, -5.0% and -9.9% for t+1,t+2 and t+3, respectively. 
The most significant conclusion, taken into account the previous analysis, is that SBO-
backed IPOs experienced a lower growth in total assets, and a lower growth in total 
sales, when compared to the other samples, are become more efficient in transforming 
the investment in assets into revenue, particularly significant in t+1 of 5.1% raw and 
11.9% industry adjusted. 
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Table IX: Sales/Assets change after the IPO 
From t-1 to t+1 From t-1 to t+2 From t-1 to t+3
All IPOs
   Median change (%)  -2,7 *** (2085)  -2.5 *** (1963)  -3.2 *** (1838)
PE-backed IPOs
   Median change (%)  -5,5 *** (303)  -5.0 *** (8284)  -9.9 *** (259)
   Median ind-adj change (%)  -0.4  (268)  -0.1  (254)  0.0  (233)
SBO-backed IPOs
   Median change (%)  5.1 * (27)  2.9  (27)  6.1  (24)
   Median ind-adj change (%)  11.9 ** (22)  6.4  (22)  15.6  (21)
This table presents the median change of the turnover assets ratio between the full year before the IPO and the three consecutive full 
years after it (t+1; t+2; t+3). The ratio is computed by the total sales over the total assets. The median is presented both raw and 
industry adjusted, i.e. adjusted to the industry and the year of the IPO. In this table all sub-samples are dependent, as the SBO-
backed IPOs are included in the PE-backed IPOs which are also included in the all IPOs sample. Industry adjusted median is not 
presented for all IPOs, as it tends towards zero. Significance levels of median change are based on a one sample Wilcoxon signed-
rank test, being *, **, *** indicative levels where median changes for each subsample are significantly different from zero and 
where both subsample medians are different at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The number of observations is in parenthesis. 
5.4 Change in EBITDA 
This measure, earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization, gives a 
proxy of cash flow, as it assess the operation income creation capacity of each firm. In 
Table X, it is possible to infer that our full sample and both of our sub-samples, i.e. PE-
backed IPOs and SBO-backed IPOs, present positive median change in EBITDA for the 
three years after the IPO. Being the raw median EBITDA growth of 74.6%, 78% and 
72.7% for all IPOs, in t+1,t+2 and t+3 respectively. The PE-backed IPOs present similar 
results while the SBO-backed IPOs present a growth of 30.8% and 31.4% in t+1 and t+2 
respectively. This lower growth experience by the SBO-backed IPOs, seems consistent 
with an underperformance on this proxy of cash flow variable, when compared to the 
other IPOs, that experienced a most higher growth rate in this measure. 
Moreover, when analysing the industry adjusted median change it becomes even clear 
the underperformance, regarding EBITDA, of the SBO-backed IPOs, being the industry 
adjusted median growth negative for all years, although those values are no statically 
significant.  
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Table X: EBITDA change after the IPO 
From t-1 to t+1 From t-1 to t+2 From t-1 to t+3
All IPOs
   Median change (%)  74.6 *** (1919)  78.0 *** (1919)  72.7 *** (1919)
PE-backed IPOs
   Median change (%)  76.6 *** (286)  70.6 *** (286)  69.2 *** (286)
   Median ind-adj change (%)  0.9 *** (257)  -0.8 * (257)  -3.2  (257)
SBO-backed IPOs
   Median change (%) 30.8 *** (26)  31.4 ** (26)  32.6  (26)
   Median ind-adj change (%)  -18.7  (22)  -36.7  (22)  -60.6  (22)
This table presents the median change of the EBITDA between the full year before the IPO and the three consecutive full years after 
it (t+1; t+2; t+3). The median is presented both raw and industry adjusted, i.e. adjusted to the industry and the year of the IPO. In 
this table all sub-samples are dependent, as the SBO-backed IPOs are included in the PE-backed IPOs which are also included in the 
all IPOs sample. Industry adjusted median is not presented for all IPOs, as it tends towards zero. Significance levels of median 
change are based on a one sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test, being *, **, *** indicative levels where median changes for each 
subsample are significantly different from zero and where both subsample medians are different at the 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. The number of observations is in parenthesis. 
 
5.4.1 Change in EBITDA margin 
The ratio explains the percentage of operation income generated from the total sales, 
thus it assess the profitability of firms. It seems oblivious that the samples do not 
experience significant changes in the EBITDA margin ratio, as can be seen in Table XI.. 
Nevertheless, the more significant results seem to show a decrease in the margin for all 
IPOs and PE-backed, supporting the idea that even though all experience growth in the 
both EBITDA and total sales, the growth in this last measure was significantly higher. 
However, between t-1 and t+2 and t+3, all IPOs and PE-backed IPOs present positive 
change in the median EBITDA margin, while only SBO-backed IPOs results are not 
significant. In summary, the not significant change of this margin can only be 
interpreted as another evidence of SBO-backed IPOs underperformance, since the 
sample present lower growth in the EBITDA and lower growth in total sales, thus not 
representing a business strategy shift. 
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Table XI: EBITDA margin change after IPO 
From t-1 to t+1 From t-1 to t+2 From t-1 to t+3
All IPOs
   Median change (%)  0.1  (1872)  -0.8 *** (1762)  -1.0 *** (1674)
PE-backed IPOs
   Median change (%)  1.1  (281)  -0.6 ** (263)  -0.8 * (240)
   Median ind-adj change (%)  0.8  (256)  0.1  (242)  0.0  (222)
SBO-backed IPOs
   Median change (%)  -0.1  (26)  -0.9  (26)  -1.2  (23)
   Median ind-adj change (%)  -0.2  (22)  0.1  (22)  -0.1  (21)
This table presents the median change of the EBITDA margin between the full year before the IPO and the three consecutive full 
years after it (t+1; t+2; t+3). The ratio was computed as EBITDA over total sales. The median is presented both raw and industry 
adjusted, i.e. adjusted to the industry and the year of the IPO. In this table all sub-samples are dependent, as the SBO-backed IPOs 
are included in the PE-backed IPOs which are also included in the all IPOs sample. Industry adjusted median is not presented for all 
IPOs, as it tends towards zero.  Significance levels of median change are based on a one sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test, being *, 
**, *** indicative levels where median changes for each subsample are significantly different from zero and where both subsample 
medians are different at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The number of observations is in parenthesis. 
5.4.2 Change in EBITDA/Assets 
This ratio is one of the most important since it assesses the capacity to generate cash 
flow with the respective assets in place, the firm’s profitability. The efficiency that a 
company uses its assets in place to successfully turn in cash flow can be measured with 
this ratio. 
The ratio, as shown in Table XII, presents a decrease for all the sub-samples, for all the 
three years after the IPO, expect one. SBO-backed IPOs, present a slightly positive 
growth in the t+1. Moreover, SBO-backed IPOs, have all experienced a decrease in the 
measure for t+2 and t+3, but significantly lower than all IPOs and PE-backed IPOs. 
Thus, confirming that, once more, with a lower growth in EBITDA and a lower growth 
in total assets, SBO-backed IPOs presented a better efficient use of assets, as the 
EBITDA growth was higher than in the other samples, when comparing to the lower 
growth of the total assets. One other analysis, we decompose the EBITDA/Assets 
analysis into, EBITDA margin and Sales/Assets. As it was presented above, in Table IX 
and Table XI, the significant outperformance of the SBO-backed IPOs in the 
Sales/Assets seems to be the most determinant factor explaining the EBITDA/Assets 
better performance experienced, when compared to other samples.  
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In terms of industry adjusted change, once more, the SBO-backed IPOs have 
experienced better results than its industry and the other samples, particularly in the t+1 
for 4.1%.   
Table XII: EBITDA/Assets change after the IPO 
From t-1 to t+1 From t-1 to t+2 From t-1 to t+3
All IPOs
   Median change (%)  -1.2 *** (1931)  -1.7 *** (1816)  -2.0 *** (1702)
PE-backed IPOs
   Median change (%)  -0.3 ** (290)  -1.5 *** (271)  -2.1 *** (247)
   Median ind-adj change (%)  0.5  (248)  0.3  (234)  0.0  (214)
SBO-backed IPOs
   Median change (%)  0.8  (27)  -0.6  (27)  -0.6  (24)
   Median ind-adj change (%)  4.1 ** (22)  2.9  (22)  3.3  (21)
This table presents the median change of the EBITDA/Assets between the full year before the IPO and the three consecutive full 
years after it (t+1; t+2; t+3). The ratio was computed as EBITDA over total assets. The median is presented both raw and industry 
adjusted, i.e. adjusted to the industry and the year of the IPO. In this table all sub-samples are dependent, as the SBO-backed IPOs 
are included in the PE-backed IPOs which are also included in the all IPOs sample. Industry adjusted median is not presented for all 
IPOs, as it tends towards zero. Significance levels of median change are based on a one sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test, being *, 
**, *** indicative levels where median changes for each subsample are significantly different from zero and where both subsample 
medians are different at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The number of observations is in parenthesis 
5.5 Change in EBITDA-CAPEX 
By subtracting to the EBITDA the investment in fixed assets (CAPEX), we can assess 
the operation income creation capacity of each firm, i.e., the available operation income 
generated to remunerate equity and debt. Table XIII presents evidence of a positive 
change in this particular measure for all the sub-samples and for all the three years after 
th IPO. Once again in the EBITDA-CAPEX measure, all the IPOs and the PE-backed 
IPOs present relatively similar results, above 50% growth each year, while the SBO-
backed IPOs a poor comparative, statically significant, growth of just 24.3% and 12.7% 
in t+1 and t+2 respectively. Moreover, when analyzing the industry adjusted median 
change it becomes even clear the underperformance, regarding this measure, of the 
SBO-backed IPOs. Being the industry adjusted median change negative in the measures 
for all the three years after the IPO, with the expectation of the t+1. 
One other interesting evidence is the fact that although the percentage growth of 
EBITDA-CAPEX is positive, is far lower than the growth of EBITDA (see Table XII) 
in the SBO-backed IPOs, which is not clear in the other samples. It may be explained by 
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From t-1 to t+1 From t-1 to t+2 From t-1 to t+3
All IPOs
   Median change (%)  82.7 *** (1922)  68.1 *** (1922)  67.1 *** (1922)
PE-backed IPOs
   Median change (%)  77.0 *** (286)  57.3 *** (286)  65.3 *** (286)
   Median ind-adj change (%)  0.2 ** (259)  0.0 * (259)  -0.4  (259)
SBO-backed IPOs
   Median change (%)  24.3 *** (26)  12.7 ** (26)  3.8  (26)
   Median ind-adj change (%)  0.3  (21)  -41.4  (21)  -52.1  (21)
the fact that an increase in capital expenditures was required since it was probably 
significantly under minded during the SBOs holding period, in order to keep up with the 
excessive debt service. 
Table XIII: EBITDA-CAPEX change after the IPO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table presents the median change of the EBITDA-CAPEX between the full year before the IPO and the three consecutive full 
years after it (t+1; t+2; t+3). The median is presented both raw and industry adjusted, i.e. adjusted to the industry and the year of the 
IPO. In this table all sub-samples are dependent, as the SBO-backed IPOs are included in the PE-backed IPOs which are also 
included in the all IPOs sample. Industry adjusted median is not presented for all IPOs, as it tends towards zero. Significance levels 
of median change are based on a one sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test, being *, **, *** indicative levels where median changes 
for each subsample are significantly different from zero and where both subsample medians are different at the 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. The number of observations is in parenthesis. 
5.5.1 Change in EBITDA-CAPEX margin 
The change in the EBITDA-CAPEX margin is also coherent with the previous figures 
analysed. As shown in Table XIV for the three-year period after the IPO, the companies 
in all sub-samples present a decrease in the ratio, with the exception of ‘all IPOs’ 
samples and the PE-backed IPOs for the t+1, the decrease seems to have a greater 
impact in the SBO-backed IPOs than in the other samples, particularly significant in t+3 
of -2.0% change  However, as expected, taking into account the EBITDA-CAPEX 
analysis, the EBITDA-CAPEX margin decrease is more significant than the EBITDA 
margin analysis, because of the higher reinvestment in fixed assets experienced by 
SBO-backed IPOs firms. The underperformance of the SBO-backed IPOs both in terms 
of EBITDA margin and EBITDA-CAPEX margin is a result of a lower growth in these 
cash flow variables than the poor growth experienced in total sales.  
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Table XIV: EBITDA-CAPEX margin change after the IPO 
From t-1 to t+1 From t-1 to t+2 From t-1 to t+3
All IPOs
   Median change (%)  0.1  (1904)  -0.9 *** (1794)  -0.4 ***  (1678)
PE-backed IPOs
   Median change (%)  0.6  (285)  -0.4  (267)  -0.6  (244)
   Median ind-adj change (%)  0.6  (244)  0.0  (230)  -0.2  (211)
SBO-backed IPOs
   Median change (%)  -0.7  (26)  -1.1  (26)  -2.0 * (23)
   Median ind-adj change (%)  0.0  (21)  0.0  (21)  -0.3  (20)
This table presents the median change of the EBITDA-CAPEX margin between the full year before the IPO and the three 
consecutive full years after it (t+1; t+2; t+3). The ratio is computed as EBITDA-CAPEX over total sales. The median is presented 
both raw and industry adjusted, i.e. adjusted to the industry and the year of the IPO. In this table all sub-samples are dependent, as 
the SBO-backed IPOs are included in the PE-backed IPOs which are also included in the all IPOs sample. Industry adjusted median 
is not presented for all IPOs, as it tends towards zero. Significance levels of median change are based on a one sample Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test, being *, **, *** indicative levels where median changes for each subsample are significantly different from zero 
and where both subsample medians are different at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The number of observations is in parenthesis. 
5.5.2 Change in EBITDA-CAPEX/Assets 
Once more the EBITDA-CAPEX/Assets ratio does not present significant different 
results from the, previously analysed, EBITDA/Assets ratio, taking to account the 
EBITDA-CAPEX lower performance of the SBO-backed IPOs. The main difference 
consist of the, already mentioned, higher reinvestment in fixed assets of SBO-backed 
IPOs firms, when compared to the other samples. Thus, the results presented in Table 
XV, are, in terms of raw change, very similar on every sample, for each year. Yet, the 
SBO-backed IPOs seem to present slightly better EBITDA-CAPEX/Assets ratio than 
both PE-backed IPOs and all IPOs. This better performance in this ratio is confirmed, 
when analysing the industry adjusted change, where the SBO-backed IPOs have a 
positive change of 4.6 for t+1, statistically significant. 
Since, in absolute terms the performance of the SBO-backed IPOs, in both EBITDA-
CAPEX and total assets is lower than the other samples, it is once more, the case of 
more efficiency in the use of the assets in place, in generating net operational cash flow. 
This more efficiency is related to a better turnover assets ratio then to a better 
performance in the EBITDA-CAPEX margin, as in the case of the EBITDA/Assets 
ratio. 
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Table XV: EBITDA-CAPEX/Assets change after the IPO 
From t-1 to t+1 From t-1 to t+2 From t-1 to t+3
All IPOs
   Median change (%)  -0.8 *** (1931)  -1.6 *** (1821)  -1.5 *** (1708)
PE-backed IPOs
   Median change (%)  -0.5 *** (290)  -2.0 *** (271)  -1.3 *** (247)
   Median ind-adj change (%)  0.1  (248)  0.0  (234)  0.0  (214)
SBO-backed IPOs
   Median change (%)  -0.4  (27)  -1.4  (27)  -1.5  (24)
   Median ind-adj change (%)  4.6 * (23)  1.6  (23)  3.2  (22)
This table presents the median change of the EBITDA-CAPEX/Assets between the full year before the IPO and the three 
consecutive full years after it (t+1; t+2; t+3). The ratio is computed as EBITDA-CAPEX over total assets. The median is presented 
both raw and industry adjusted, i.e. adjusted to the industry and the year of the IPO. In this table all sub-samples are dependent, as 
the SBO-backed IPOs are included in the PE-backed IPOs which are also included in the all IPOs sample. Industry adjusted median 
is not presented for all IPOs, as it tends towards zero. Significance levels of median change are based on a one sample Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test, being *, **, *** indicative levels where median changes for each subsample are significantly different from zero 
and where both subsample medians are different at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The number of observations is in parenthesis. 
5.6 Change in net Cash Flow  
The change in net cash flow assesses the cash flow generated by companies, either by 
the operational performance, operation revenue, or by a better management of the 
working capital, other sources of revenue. The results shown in Table XVI present some 
very interesting evidence, particularly regarding the PE-backed IPOs, and also 
particularly the SBO-backed IPOs. As we have been analysing so far, there were no 
evidence supporting a better performance of neither the PE-backed IPOs nor the SBO-
backed IPOs when comparing to the all IPOs sample. The only noticeable evidence 
supports an underperformance of the SBO backed IPOs and a similar performance, 
when comparing to the “market”, of the PE-backed IPOs. Nonetheless, in this measure 
we can clearly see a better performance of the PE-backed IPOs and SBO-backed IPOs 
in the median growth of net cash flow, especially between t+1 and t-1. However, only in 
the case of the SBO-backed IPOs there seems to be stability on that growth, as in the 
other two samples, they experience a decrease in the growth in the t+2 and even a 
negative change in the t+3. As we have analysed the EBITDA measure before and it 
presented a particular poor result regarding the SBO-backed IPOs, it makes safe to 
assume the net cash flow produce by those same companies is being generated by a 
strong negative change in the working capital. It cannot be an evidence to overlook as it 
is assumed that private equity firms would actively managed the working capital in 
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order to turn the firms financially capable for the high amount of debt service that they 
are obliged to.  
The industry adjusted median also corroborates the same conclusions, as the SBO-
backed IPOs present positive change in all the three years, particularly significant in the 
change between t+3 and t-1, when the median change was of 43.1%.  
Table XVI: net Cash Flow change after the IPO 
From t-1 to t+1 From t-1 to t+2 From t-1 to t+3
All IPOs
   Median change (%)  20.9 ***(2050)  7.6 ***(2050)  -12.4 * (2050)
PE-backed IPOs
   Median change (%)  38.0 ***(304)  22.0 ** (304)  -16.9 (304)
   Median ind-adj change (%)  7.6 * (276)  0.0  (276)  0.0  (276)
SBO-backed IPOs
   Median change (%)  34.3 ** (26)  33.1 ** (26)  33.8 (26)
   Median ind-adj change (%)  22.2  (22)  11.9  (22)  43.1 ** (22)  
This table presents the median change of the Cash Flow between the full year before the IPO and the three consecutive full years 
after it (t+1; t+2; t+3). The figure was computed as the sum of EBITDA minus the change in net Working Capital. The median is 
presented both raw and industry adjusted, i.e. adjusted to the industry and the year of the IPO. In this table all sub-samples are 
dependent, as the SBO-backed IPOs are included in the PE-backed IPOs which are also included in the all IPOs sample. Industry 
adjusted median is not presented for all IPOs, as it tends towards zero. Significance levels of median change are based on a one 
sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test, being *, **, *** indicative levels where median changes for each subsample are significantly 
different from zero and where both subsample medians are different at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The number of 
observations is in parenthesis. 
5.6.1 Change in net Cash Flow margin 
The net cash flow margin ratio seems to support, on one hand, the PE-backed IPOs and 
SBO-backed IPOs outperformance in the absolute change in net cash flow and on the 
other, the lower performance in the total sales change, particularly in the case of the 
SBO-backed IPOs. In Table XVII, the results present a poor performance of all the sub-
samples in all three years after the IPO. If in the case of the PE-backed IPOs and SBO-
backed IPOs that underperformance is justified by the poor performance in total sales, 
all IPOs experienced a worst performance in the change in cash flow rather than the 
total sales growth, when comparing to the other samples. In the particular case of the 
SBO-backed IPOs, the positive growth of net cash flow as more penalised by a poor 
growth in sales, so SBO-backed IPOs firms generated less net cash flow for the same 
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proportion of sales, particularly in a magnitude of -2.7%, between t-1 and t+3, 
statistically significant. 
Table XVII: net Cash Flow margin change after the IPO 
From t-1 to t+1 From t-1 to t+2 From t-1 to t+3
All IPOs
   Median change (%)  -1.0 *** (1921)  -1.2 *** (1812)  -1.5 *** (1695)
PE-backed IPOs
   Median change (%)  0.0  (287)  -0.8 ** (269)  -1.3 ** (246)
   Median ind-adj change (%)  0.0  (250)  -0.3  (236)  0.0  (217)
SBO-backed IPOs
   Median change (%)  -1.6  (26)  -0.7  (26)  -2.7 * (23)
   Median ind-adj change (%)  0.0  (22)  -1.7  (22)  0.8  (21)
 This table presents the median change of  the net cash flow/Sales between the full year before the IPO and the three consecutive 
full years after it (t+1; t+2; t+3). The ratio was computed as net cash flow over total sales. The median is presented both raw and 
industry adjusted, i.e. adjusted to the industry and the year of the IPO. In this table all sub-samples are dependent, as the SBO-
backed IPOs are included in the PE-backed IPOs which are also included in the all IPOs sample. Industry adjusted median is not 
presented for all IPOs, as it tends towards zero. Significance levels of median change are based on a one sample Wilcoxon signed-
rank test, being *, **, *** indicative levels where median changes for each subsample are significantly different from zero and 
where both subsample medians are different at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The number of observations is in parenthesis 
5.6.2 Change in net Cash Flow/Assets 
The ratio is computed by dividing the net cash flow generated over the firm’s total 
assets. It assesses the efficiency to produce cash flow, as it is generated by the assets in 
place. In Table XVIII is possible to see that all IPOs are underperforming in this ratio in 
the three years after the IPO. Both PE-backed IPOs and SBO-backed IPOs also follow 
the tendency, although the negative tendency is only significantly strong in the PE-
backed IPOs, particularly significant in t+2 and t+3, of -1.7% and -2.6%, respectively. 
Once again, SBO-backed IPOs seem to present the best performance, however its 
performance is explained, on the one hand by the positive change in net cash flow 
generated, when compared to its peers and the other sub-samples, and on the other hand, 
with the fact that total assets present a lower increase than the other samples, and a 
strongly negative change when adjusted to the industry. So in sum, SBO-backed IPOs 
generated more net cash flow with less investment in total assets, thus being more 
effective about return on the capital employed. Nevertheless, since negative changes in 
the working capital were the main component of the net cash flow generated by those 
firms, rather than the EBITDA that present underperformance when compared to other 
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samples and peers, it also greatly influences the lower grow on total assets. Hence, by 
reducing the investment in working capital, SBO-backed IPOs firms were able to 
generate more cash flow and reduce the investment on current assets, which can be a 
plausible explain for the lower growth of those firms on that particular measure. 
However, the results of SBO-backed IPOs are not statistically significant, both raw and 
industry adjusted, which makes impossible to take a robust conclusion about those firms 
performance. 
Table XVIII: net Cash Flow/Assets change after IPO 
From t-1 to t+1 From t-1 to t+2 From t-1 to t+3
All IPOs
   Median change (%)  -1.3 ***(1893)  -1.8 ***(1781)  -2.0 ***(1672)
PE-backed IPOs
   Median change (%)  -0.9 ** (285)  -1.7 ***(266)  -2.6 ***(242)
   Median ind-adj change (%)  -0.1  (258)  -0.5 * (240)  -0.1  (220)
SBO-backed IPOs
   Median change (%)  0.6 (26)  0.0 (26)  -1.9 (23)
   Median ind-adj change (%)  4.0  (22)  1.2  (22)  1.7  (21)
    This table presents the median change of  the net cash flow/Assets between the full year before the IPO and the three consecutive 
full years after it (t+1; t+2; t+3). The ratio was computed as net cash flow over total assets. The median is presented both raw and 
industry adjusted, i.e. adjusted to the industry and the year of the IPO. In this table all sub-samples are dependent, as the SBO-
backed IPOs are included in the PE-backed IPOs which are also included in the all IPOs sample. Industry adjusted median is not 
presented for all IPOs, as it tends towards zero. Significance levels of median change are based on a one sample Wilcoxon signed-
rank test, being *, **, *** indicative levels where median changes for each subsample are significantly different from zero and 
where both subsample medians are different at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The number of observations is in parenthesis. 
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6. Conclusions 
The purpose of this dissertation was to study how the secondary buyouts and the 
consequent increase of time spent on a Private Equity portfolio would affect the post-
IPO performance of the company under PE management. The holding period of 
companies by Private Equity funds increased after the 2000’s, with the boom of the 
secondary buy-outs (SBO) transactions. In order to study the impact of the increase in 
the holding period, we analysed the operational performance of initial public offerings 
of firms dividing our sample into 3 dependent categories: all the IPOs; PE-backed IPOs, 
all leverage buyout IPOs; and then particularly the SBO-backed IPOs (IPOs of a firm 
that has at least two successive PE owners). 
Our results seem to strongly suggest that SBO-backed IPOs have indeed 
underperformed, in absolute terms, the other IPOs, regular IPOs and PE-backed IPOs. 
With the exception of net cash flow change, influenced by a strong decrease in the 
investment in working capital, all other absolute changes, particularly in total equity, 
total assets, total sales, EBITDA and EBITDA-CAPEX figures, present significant 
lower results, when comparing to the other IPOs samples and the industry adjusted 
peers.  
Although, in terms of relative performance, the asset turnover ratio, the efficiency ratio, 
seems to present a better SBO-backed IPOs performance that positively influenced all 
cash flow variables when analysed as a fraction of the assets in place, measuring the 
productivity for those firms. However, the profitability ratio, i.e. the cash flow variables 
over total sales, does not support the operational improve stated above, as SBO-backed 
IPOs firm’s seem to experienced worst than the other samples, both raw and industry 
adjusted. Those ratios presenting a better or at least equal to the “market” performance 
for the SBO-backed IPOs, are evidence of just a better management of efficiency and 
productivity as, in absolute terms both total assets and the cash flow variables 
underperform, with the expectation of net cash flow change analysed above, comparing 
with all IPOs and PE-backed IPOs. Most importantly, evidence supporting this better 
performance is not strongly significant in all ratios, for each year, which may mislead 
the conclusions. 
37 
 
The supporting evidence that Private Equity may be a good “shock therapy”, as 
Rappaport suggested, rather than the “ultimate governance structure”, as Jenson 
suggested, may be related to the financial constrains to which the debt service impose, 
and the lack of alternative revenues to generate cash, such as unallocated assets. 
Moreover, the increase in capital expenditures after the IPO, on the SBO-backed IPOs 
firms may also be related to the fact that those firms’ capital expenditures were 
neglected during the Private Equity ownership, thus compromising the stream of future 
cash flows. However, the evidence suggesting the strong decrease of working capital in 
the years following the IPO are somewhat unexpected since if Private Equity firms had 
to generate as much cash flow as possible, in particular alternative sources of income, 
the investment in working capital should be minimized, enhance the capacity to collect 
receivables, extending the maturity of short term debt and accounts payables, and take 
the inventories levels to the minimum required amount. The fact that in such short 
period of time, the managers were able to shrink that investment in working capital as 
much as the results present, may suggest a poor PE management on that particular 
matter. 
Even though the SBO-backed IPOs firms’ underperformance is strongly evidenced in 
our work, the small size of our dataset affects the significance of results.  Since most 
firms were only mostly acquired by a second Private Equity investor after the year 
2000, it is most likely the majority of firms have not exist the portfolio soon enough for 
us to have information about the post-IPO performance. The lack of firms under those 
conditions may be most noticeable handicap of our investigation, given room for others 
to study the same problematic for other perspective, for example the performance on the 
financial markets, and with more data, as probably since 2009 more and more firms 
being listed came from a secondary leverage buyout transaction.   
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